Preface
PART Ⅰ Game Theory Background
1 Static Games and Solution Concepts
1.1 Strategic Form Games
1.2 Solution Concepts
1.2.1 Dominant and D ominated Strategies
1.2.2 Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies
1.2.3 Nash Equilibrium
1.2.4 Correlated Equilibrium
1.3 Existence of a Nash Equilibrium
1.3.1 G ames with Finite Pure Strategy Sets
1.3.2 G ames with Infinite Pure Strategy Sets
1.3.3 Continuous Games
1.3.4 Discontinuous Games
1.4 Uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium
1.A Appendix: Metric Spaces and Probability Measures
1.B Appendix: Nonlinear Optimization
2 Game Theory Dynamics
2.1 Extensive Form Games
2.2 Learning Dynamics in Games-Fictitious Play
2.2.1 Convergence of Fictitious Play
2.2.2 Non-convergence of Fictitious Play
2.2.3 Convergence Proofs
2.3 Games with Special Structure
2.3.1 Supermodular Games
2.3.2 Potential Games
2.A Appendix: Lattices
PART Ⅱ Network Games
3 Wireline Network Games
3.1 Selfish Routing, Wardrop Equilibrium and Efficiency
3.1.1 Routing Model
3.1.2 Wardrop Equilibrium
3.1.3 Inefficiency of the Equilibrium
3.1.4 Multiple Origin-Destination Pairs
3.2 Partially Optimal Routing
3.2.1 Background and Motivation
3.2.2 The Model
3.2.3 Efficiency of Partially Optimal Routing
3.2.4 Extensions
3.3 Congestion and Provider Price Competition
3.3.1 Pricing and Efficiency with Congestion Externalities
3.3.2 Model
3.3.3 Monopoly Pricing and Equilibrium
3.3.4 Oligopoly Pricing and Equilibrium
3.3.5 Efficiency Analysis
3.3.6 Extensions
3.4 Concluding Remarks
4 Wireless Network Games
4.1 Noncooperative Transmission Scheduling in Collision Channels
4.1.1 The Model and Preliminaries
4.1.2 Equilibrium Analysis
4.1.3 Achievable Channel Capacity
4.1.4 Best-Response Dynamics
4.1.5 Discussion
4.2 Noncooperative Power Control in Collision Channels
4.2.1 The Model
4.2.2 Equilibrium Analysis
4.2.3 Best-Response Dynamics and Convergence to the Power Efficient Equilibrium
4.2.4 Equilibrium (In) Efficiency and Braess-Like Paradoxes
4.2.5 Discussion
4.3 Related Work and Extensions
4.4 Future Directions
5 Future Perspectives
Bibliography
Authors' Biographies

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