《博弈论与社会契约》是世界著名的英国经济学大师肯·宾默尔的代表著作，被认为会像亚当·斯密的《国富论》一样在人类思想史上留下重要一页。宾默尔把霍布斯、休谟、卢梭、康德、斯密、罗尔斯和哈萨尼这些人类思想史上的巨擘们的基本观点，纯熟地用博弈论模型建构出来并进行比较，以博弈论为系统工具建立了独到的经济伦理思想模型。本书是《博弈论与社会契约》的第2卷：《公正博弈》。

Apology
Series Foreword
Reading Guide
Acknowledgment
Introduction：Setting the Scene
0.1 Whither Away7
0.2 The Art of Compromise
0.2.1 Nonsense upon Stilts
0.2.2 Social Contracts
0.2.3 Reform
0.2.4 The Original Position
0.2.5 Bargaining
0.3 Moral Philosophy
0.3.1 Traditional Philosophical Categories
0.3.2 Fin de Siecle
0.4 Noncooperative Game Theory
0.4.1 The Ultimatum Gaxne
0.4.2 Anomalies7
0.5 Cooperative Game Theory
0.5.1 Games in Coalitional Form
0.6 Nash Program
0.7 Implementation
1 Nuances of Negotiation
1.1 Realistic Bargaining Models
1.2 Bargaining Problems
1.2.1 Payoff Regions
1.2.2 Nash Bargaining Problems
1.2.3 The Bargaining Set
1.2.4 Dividing the Dollar
1.2.5 Edgeworth Box
1.3 Bargaining Solutions
1.3.1 Nash Bargaining Solution
1.3.2 Kalai—Smorodinsky Solution
1.3.3 Bargaining with Interpersonal Comparison
1.4 Characterizing Bargaining Solutions
1.4.1 The Kalai—Smorodinsky Axioms
1.4.2 The Nash Axioms
1.4.3 Renegotiation Axioms
1.5 Bargaining with Commitment
1.5.1 Nash Demand Game
1.5.2 Fixed and Variable Threats
1.6 Trustless Transactions
1.6.1 Repeated Games
1.6.2 Transitional Arrangements
1.7 Bargaining without Commitment
1.7.1 The Alternating Ofiers Game
1.7.2 How Realistic iS Rubinstein’S Model7
1.8 Other Approaches to Bargaining
1.8.1 The Coase Theorem
1.8.2 Gauthier on Bargaining over a Social Contract
2 Evolution in Edell
2.1 The Good，the Right，and the Seemly
2.2 Utilitarianism
2.2.1 Summum Bonum
2.2.2 Ipsedixists
2.2.3 Ideal Observers
2.2.4 Philosopher—King
2.2.5 The Social Contract Approach
2.2.6 Rule—Utilitarianism or Act.Utilitarianism7
2.2.7 The Big Picture
2.3 Fictitious Postulatum7
2.3.1 Interpersonal Comparison of Utility
2.4 Evolutionary Ethics
2.5 Evolution and Justice
2.5.1 Reciprocity
2.5.2 Kinship
2.5.3 Equilibrium Selection
2.5.4 Empathy and Fairness
2.5.5 The Long and the Short and the Medium
2.6 Nonteleological Utilitarianism
2.6.1 Commitment in Eden
2.6.2 Interpersonal Comparison in the Medium Run
2.6.3 Retelling the Rawlsian Story
2.7 Morality as a Short.Run Phenomenon
2.7.1 The Princess and the Pea
2.7.2 HOW Justice Wbrks
2.8 Why Not Utilitarianism7
3 Rationalizing Reciprocity
3.1 Back-scratching
3.2 Rights in a Theory of the Seemly
3.2.1 mghts as Strategies7
3.2.2 Rules for Sustaining an Equilibrium
3.2.3 Moral Responsibility
3.2.4 nee WiU
3.2.5 Nil Desperandum
3.3 FOlk Theorem
3.3.1 Memes
3.3.2 Finite Automata
3.3.3 Computing Payoffs
3.3.4 Reciprocal Sharing
3.3.5 Crime and Punishment
3.3.6 Guardians Who Guard Each Other
3.3.7 Tit for Tat7
3.3.8 HOW Does Cooperation Evolve7
3.4 Social Contracts in Big Societies
3.4.1 Social Transfers
3.4.2 niendship and Coalitions
3.4.3 Police Forces
3.4.4 Punishing the Innocent
3.4.5 Leadership and Authority
3.5 The Role of the Emotions
3.5.1 Sore Thumbs
3.5.2 Tunnel Vision
3.6 Due Process
3.6.1 Anarchy to Statehood
3.6.2 Natural Equilibrium
3.7 Renegotiation
3.7.1 Getting from Here to There
3.7.2 Renegotiation in the Original Position
3.7.3 Making the Punishment Fit the Crime
3.7.4 Renegotiation—Proofness
3.8 What about Moral Values7
3.8.1 Confusing Tastes and Values
3.8.2 Das Adam Smith Problem
3.8.3 Postwelfarism
3.8.4 What Moral Relativism Is Not
4 Yearning for Utopia
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Envy
4.3 Equity in Economics
4.3.1 Envy—Freeness
4.3.2 welfarism
4.4 Equity in Psychology
4.5 Equity in Anthropology
4.5.1 Shari