《激励理论：委托代理模型》是著名微观理论经济学家拉奉特以及其学生martimort的合写的理论著作，其影响力可想而知。经济学和激励的关系密切，如激励努力工作、激励高质量产品、激励努力学习、激励投资和激励储蓄。尽管adam smith两百多年前在他的佃农合同分析中充分肯定了这一点，但只有在近些年这个理论在经济思想中才占据了核心地位。本书中，jean-jacques laffont 和david martimort对激励理论的表述是目前最透彻的和最容易学习的。本理论的核心是对现代管理就如同对经济理论一样至关重要的简单问题：是什么让人们在一个经济和商业环境中会有特殊的表现？为了寻找答案，书中给出了特定的环境下能够确保对经济机构的良好激励的方法论工具。

读者对象：数学、经济相关专业的本科生、研究生和相关经济领域的从业人员。

Foreword

Introduction

l Incentives in Economic Thought

 1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture

 1.2 Chester Barlmrd and Incentives in Management

 1.3 Hume, Wicksell, Groves: Tile Free-Rider Problem

 1.4 Borda, Bowen, Vickrey: Incentives in Voting

 1.5 Leon Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies

 1.6 Knight, Arrow, Pauly: Incentives in Insurance

 1.7 Sidgwick, Vickrey, Mirrlees: Redistribution and Incentives

 1.8 Dupuit, Edgeworth, Pigou: Price Discrimination

 1.9 Incentives in Planned Economies

 1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design

 1.11 Auctions

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off

 2.1 The Basic Model

 2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract

 2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts

 2.4 Information Rents

 2.5 The Optimization Program of the Principal

 2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off

 2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information

 2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing

 2.9 Tile Revelation Principle

 2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent

 2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints

 2.12 Commitment

 2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms,

 2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting,

 2.15 Contract Theory at Work

 Appendix

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection

 3.1 More than Two Types

 3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information

 3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and Countervailing IncentiTces

 3.4 Random Participation Constraint

 3,5 Limited Liability

 3,6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification

 3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off

 Appendices

4 Moral Hazard: The Basic Trade-Offs

 4.1 Tile Model

 4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best hnplementation

 4.3 The Trade-Off Between Limited Liability Rent Extraction and Efficiency

 4.4 Tile Trade-Off Between Insurance and Efficiency

 4.5 More than Two Levels of Performance

 4.6 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting

 4.7 Moral Hazard and the Theory of the Finn

 4.8 Contract Theory at Work

 4.9 Commitment Under Moral Hazard.

 Appendices

5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard.

 5.1 More than Two Levels of Effort

 5.2 The Multitask Incentive Problem

 5.3 Nonseparability of the Utility Function

 5.4 Redistribution and Moral Hazard Appendices

6 Nonverifiability

 6.1 No Contract at Date 0 and Ex Post Bargaining

 6.2 Incentive Compatible Contract

 6.3 Nash Implementation

 6.4 Subgame-Perfect Implementation

 6.5 Risk Aversion

 6.6 Concluding Remarks

7 Mixed Models

 7.1 Adverse Selection Followed by Moral Hazard

 7.2 Moral Hazard Followed by Adverse Selection

 7.3 Moral Hazard Followed by Nonverifiability

8 Dynamics under Full Commitment

 8.1 Repeated Adverse Selection

 b.2 Repeated Moral Hazard

 8.3 Constraints on Transfers: The Role of hnplicit Incentives

9 Limits and Extensions

 9.1 Informed Principal.

 9.2 Limits to Enforcement

 9.3 Dynamics and Limited Commitment

 9.4 The Hold-Up Problem

 9.5 Limits to the Complexity of Contracts

 9.6 Limits in the Action Space

 9.7 Limits to Rational Behavior

 9.8 Endogenous Information Structures

References

Author Index

Subject Index