弗兰克·梯利（Frank Thilly，1865—1934），美国著名哲学家和哲学史家，曾先后在密苏里州立大学、普林斯顿大学、康乃尔大学教授哲学和心理学，并于1915年至1921年间担任康奈尔大学文学院院长。著作有《西方哲学史》《伦理学导论》等。

本书为中英双语两本，以硬装盒装形式呈现。它是一部讲述西方哲学发展历程的著作，其雏形为梯利教授在大学任教时的讲义。此次出版，共有中英文两本。具体分为希腊哲学、中世纪哲学、近代哲学三编。往下又划分为自然哲学、知识和行为问题、重建时期、伦理运动、宗教运动、基督教和中世纪哲学的古典来源、经院哲学的形成期、文艺复兴时期的哲学、英国经验主义的开端、欧洲大陆的唯理论、启蒙运动哲学、康德的批判哲学、德国的唯心主义、黑格尔之后的德国哲学、法国和英国的哲学、法对理性主义和唯心主义等二十篇。篇下设章，讲述更为具体。文后附原书索引，便于读者检索细目。中文字数接近七十万，是一部规模宏大的哲学史著作。此次中英文两册一起出版，规模浩大，出版方特意延请业内的两位哲学博士共同翻译打造校准，力求让此选题更加精准、完善，让更多学人、哲学爱好者，一起了解并传播西方哲学。

Introduction
PART ONE. GREEK PHILOSOPHY
Ⅰ. Philosophy of Nature
1. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF EARLY GREEK THOUCHT.
History of Greek Philosophy —— Environment—— Politics—— Literature —— Religious Origins of Greek Philosophy—— Survey of Greek Philosophy
2. DEVELOPMENT OF PRE-SOPHISTIC PHILOSOPHY
3. THE PROBLEM OF SUBSTANCE
Thales —— Anaximander —— Anaximenes —— Pythagorasand His School
4. THE PROBLEM OF CHANGE
Permanence and Change —— Heraclitus —— The EleaticSchool
5. QUALITATIVE THEORIES
Solution of the Riddle of Change —— Empedocles ——Anaxagoras
6. QUANTITATIVE THEORIES
The Atomism of Democritus —— Metaphysics and Cosmology—— Psychology and Theory of Knowledge—— Theology and Ethics
Ⅱ. Problems of Knowledge and Conduct
7. THE AGE OF THE SOPHISTS
Progress of Thought —— Greek Enlightenment —— The Sophists
8. SOCRATES AND THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS
The Socratic Problem —— The Socratic Method —— The Socratic Ethics —— The Socratic Schools
Ⅲ. The Age of Reconstruction
9. PLATO
Plato and His Problem —— Dialectic and Theory of Knowledge —— Hierarchy of the Sciences —— Doctrine of Ideas —— Philosophy of Nature —— Cosmology —— Psychology —— Doctrine of Immortality —— Ethics —— Politics ——Plato's Historical Position- The Platonic School
10. ARISTOTLE
Aristotle's Problems —— Philosophy and the Sciences ——Logic —— Metaphysics —— The Four Causes —— Theology—— Physics —— Biology —— Psychology —— Ethics —— Politics —— Aristotle's Genius and Influence —— Post-Aristotelian Philosophy
Ⅳ. The Ethical Movement
11. THE OUTLOOK
12. EPICUREANISM
The Problem —— Logic and Epistemology —— Meta——physics —— Psychology —— Ethics —— Social and Political Philosophy
13. STOICISM
Zeno and His School —— Logic and Theory of Knowl-edge —— Metaphysics —— Cosmology —— Psychology ——Ethics —— Politics —— Religion —— Resume of Greek Ethics
14. SKEPTICISM AND ECLECTICISM
The Skeptical School —— Doctrines of the School ——Later Skeptics —— Eclecticism
Ⅴ. The Religious Movement
15. JEWISH-GREEK PHILOSOPHY
Philosophy and Religion —— Beginnings of Jewish-Greek Philosophy —— Philo
16. NEOPLATONISM
Pythagorean Sources of Neoplatonism —— Neoplatonism—— Plotinus —— Later Neoplatonism —— Closing of the School at Athens

PART TWO. MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY
Ⅵ. Christian and Classical Sources of Medieval Philosophy
Ⅶ. The Formative Period of Scholasticism
Ⅷ. The Period of Maturity： The Thirteenth Century
Ⅸ. Period of Decline： After the Thirteenth Century

PART THREE. MODERN PHILOSOPHY
Ⅹ. Philosophy of the Renaissance
Ⅺ. The Beginnings of British Empiricism
Ⅻ. Continental Rationalism
ⅩⅢ. The Development of British Empiricism
ⅩⅣ. The Development of Rationalism in Germany
ⅩⅤ The Philosophy of the Enlightenment
ⅩⅥ. The Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant
ⅩⅦ. German Idealism
ⅩⅧ. German Philosophy after Hegel
ⅩⅨ. Philosophy in France and England
ⅩⅩ. Reaction against Rationalism and Idealism
Index

Preface to the Revised Edition

THE FIRST edition of the late Professor Thilly’s A History ol Philosophy appeared over thirty-five years ago. Few books in the fields of philosophy or history have maintained undiminished popularity as texts and usefulness as reference works over so long a period. The remarkable vitality of Professor Thilly’s work may be traced to its original conception and execution.

Perhaps the outstanding characteristic of Professor Thilly’s approach to the history of philosophy was the objectivity and impartiality of his historical attitude, which escaped the distorting effect of a dogmatic interpretation of historical development. Professor Thilly allowed the philosophers to speak for themselves and, in the conviction that the later systems in the history of philosophy provide the criticism of earlier schools, kept his own criticism to a minimum.

Professor Thilly’s own two major philosophical commitments were to idealism and rationalism, but he did not allow his own philosophical biases to obtrude in his account of the historical figures with whom he dealt. Indeed, if anything, he was frequently more successful in the presentation of historical theories with which he was in disagreement than of those with which he was in sympathy. His idealism was not of the dogmatic Hegelian variety, but was closer to the critical idealism of Kant. Professor Thilly considered mind an indubitable fact whose existence was guaranteed by introspective experience. His idealism was, however, not a subjectivism which denied the external world or reduced it to the status of mere appearance, and his rationalism insisted that experience, or nature, has rational structure and coherence which render it intelligible to man’s rational mind. His was not a dogmatic rationalism of the Cartesian variety which posits innate, self-evident truths, but rather a critical rationalism, which considers the basic truths of mathematics and the underlying assumptions of science and philosophy to be indispensable presuppositions of an intelligible world.

A second feature of the book which explains its sustained success is the sense of proportion displayed in the presentation of thinkers in their place in philosophical movements. Without adopting an Hegelian dialectic of the history of philosophy, Thilly discerned an inner logic in historical development. Individual thinkers were integrated to movements, and the movements in their turn formed parts of a larger historical pattern. His recognition of the inner logic of the historical process did not, however, prevent his giving due recognition to the social, political, cultural, and personal or temperamental factors which influence individual philosophers. Thilly’s assimilation of philosophers to movements was particularly skillful in his organization of the modern period. Bacon and Hobbes were grouped together as two relatively independent figures who, while not properly part of the British empiricism of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, prepared the way for it. Descartes and Spinoza were considered together as the founders of continental rationalism, and Leibniz, instead of being included, as was customary, as the third in the triumvirate of rationalists, was introduced after British empiricism as a philosopher of the enlightenment.

A third feature was the clarity and simplicity of Professor Thilly’s style. In discussing with me the composition of his history Professor Thilly told me that the book grew out of a study of the history of philosophy written with no intention of publication, but solely for the purpose of clarifying his own understanding of the historical philosophers and their relations to one another. This clarification which Thilly achieved for himself pervades the entire exposition.

Professor Thilly’s interest in the history of philosophy was not that of the historical antiquarian who seeks merely to record the achievements of the past, nor was it primarily that of the historian of ideas who merely traces the continuous history of ideas and conceptions. It was that of the philosopher who seeks philosophical illumination in the history of his subject. He thought of the history of philosophy as a repository of philosophical ideas from which the philosopher draws his materials and his insights. He rejected the study of the history of philosophy merely for its own sake, but at the same time deplored the pseudo-originality of those who are ignorant of the philosophical achievements of the past. The study of the history of philosophy, he said in his introduction, “serves as a useful preparation to philosophical speculation, passing, as it does, from the simpler to the more complex and difficult constructions of thought... The man who tries to construct a system of philosophy in absolute independence of the work of his predecessors cannot hope to rise very far beyond the crude theories of the beginnings of civilization.” This Professor Thilly conceived to be the value of this historical study for himself, and this is the value he hoped it would have for his readers.

I have tried in the present revision to preserve the objective and impartial attitude of the original, and have retained the basic organization except when modification seemed to be indicated by the altered historical perspective. Considerable new material has been introduced, particularly in introductory and transitional sections. In section I the religious sources of Greek philosophy have been traced, in the light of the work of such histories as Cornford’s and Jaeger’s, to indicate more clearly both how Greek philosophy emerged from Greek religion and the essential differences between philosophy and the religion from which it arose. The organization of sections 5 and 6 has been recast so as to emphasize the differences between qualitative and quantitative theories and to give greater prominence to the quantitative atomism of Democritus.

In the section on Plato I have prepared new material on the “Hierarchy of the Sciences,”“Cosmology,” and the “Doctrine of Immortality,” and in the section on Aristotle, material on “The Four Causes” and “Aristotle’s Genius and Influence” has been added. Sections 17, 20, and 22 have been entirely rewritten, so as to provide a more adequate transition from the ancient to the medieval period, and also to afford a preliminary survey of scholasticism.

The most extensive changes and additions have been made in Part Three, on Modern Philosophy. The sections on the “Philosophy of the Renaissance,” which, in Professor Thilly’s arrangement, were appended to “The Decline of Scholasticism” in Part Two, have been reoriented and transferred to Part Three. In the section on Kant I have added material on “The Transcendental Method,”“Preliminary Analysis of Experience,” and “The Unity of SelfConsciousness,” in order to clarify Kant’s philosophical method and to differentiate it more sharply from the methods of empiricism and rationalism. A comprehensive account of Nietzsche is presented in section 66; it considers Nietzsche in the historical context of German philosophy rather than, as did Professor Thilly’s treatment, in the context of contemporary pragmatism.