本书收录世界各国经济学者特别是海内外中国经济学者从事当代经济学和金融学理论研究和实际研究的前沿成果。就激励理论专题，作者把已经发表的论文收集成册。对于书中已公开发表的论文一律保持其发表时的各刊物排版印制的原貌，以方便读者查寻援引；尚未公开发表的论文则一律保持其创作原貌，以供读者参考。本书理论深奥，观点新颖，具有一定的学术价值。

Acknowledgments

Introduction

Part I General Equilibrium and Incentives

1. On Moral Hazard in General Equilibrium Theory (With E.HELPMAN), Journal of Economic Theory, 10: 8 -23,1975.

2.Optimism and Experts against Adverse Selection in a Competitive Economy, Journal of Economic Theory, 10:284 -308,1975.

……

Part II Foundations of Incentive Theory à propos the Free Rider Problem

6.Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods (with J.GREEN), Econometrica, 45:427-438, 1977.

7.Partial Equilibrium Approach to the Free-Rider Problem (with J.GREEN and E.KOHLBERG), Journal of Public Economics, 6:375-394, 1976.

……

Part III Advanced Topics in Incentive Theory

13.Patrially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design(with J.GREEN),Review of Economic Studies,53:447-456,1986.

14.Incentive Theory with Data Compression(with J.GREEN),in Volume in Honor of K.ARROW,W.Heller,R.Starr, and D. Starrett, eds., Cambridge University Press,Ch.10,239-253,1986.

……

Part V Incomplete Contracts

25.Renehotiation and the Form of Efficient Contracts (with J.GREEN), Annales d'Economie et de Statistique,25/26:123-150,1992.

……

Part VI Lack of Commitment

27.Posterior Implementability in a Two-Person Decision Problem (With J.GREEN),Econometrica,55(1):69-94,1987.

……

Another body of literature, which grows very rapidly, is concerned with temporary equilibrium [7,9,15,17]Here again, subjective probability distributions are assumed to be given.